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Abstract
Purpose: This paper aims to examine debt accumulation 
between enterprises and debt repayment of local 
government which is linked with local government 
guarantee that acts as a debt transferring mechanism. 
The purpose is to illustrate that it is essential to pursue 
a sustainable fiscal policy of local governments so 
that decrease debt dependence during the processes of 
promoting economic growth.
Design/methodology/approach: The channel of how the 
partial debts of non-financial enterprise to be transferred 
into the debt repayment of local governments is explicated 
by the theory of soft budget constraint and the mechanism 
of debt transferring - local government guarantee. The 
feasible generalized least squares regression model is used 
to test the hypotheses. The sample data include debts of 
non-financial industries, bad loans of commercial banks 
and debt repayment of local governments in nineteen 
provinces that are published from the official database of 
national Ministries over the period from 2007 to 2016.
Findings: The results demonstrated that there is a 
positive relationship between enterprise debts and the 
debt repayment of local governments. In addition, there 
is symbiotic phenomenon between corporate debts and 
debt repayment of local government, that is, the current 
patterns of industrial investment and financing of local 
governments may cause production overcapacity and 
enterprise debt accumulation on the one hand, and shift 
enterprise debt and bad loans to the debt repayment 
of local governments through the debt transferring 
mechanism on the other.
Originality/value: This research verifies the positive 
relationship between enterprise’s bad loans of bank 
and the debt repayment of local governments through 
introducing debt risk transferring mechanism, and thus 
provides empirical evidence for central government to 
prohibit the debt guaranteed of local governments and to 
enforce hard budget constraints.
Key words: Managing debt risks; Enterprise debts; 
Debt repayment of local governments; Local government 
guarantee 
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INTRODUCTION
Debt default and serious debt risk are the fundamental 
sources of the contemporary financial crisis (Wang et al., 
2016). As the biggest developing country in the world, 
governments play a dominant role in enhancing economic 
growth and promoting market economy in China (Xi et 
al., 2017). Nevertheless, after a period of rapid economic 
growth, the unsustainability of corporate debts and local 
government debts is emerging. The potential debt risk of 
Chinese enterprises has attracted wide attention both in 
academic circle and policy makers at home and abroad 
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(IMF, 2016; Grewal, 2015; Liang, 2017). The ratio of 
total debt to GDP reached 249%, in which corporate 
debt accounted for 163% in the year 2015(BIS, 2015). 
The increase of enterprise debts may push up bank’s 
bad loans because Chinese corporates mainly rely on 
financing from banks. The ratio of credit to GDP of non-
financial enterprise has gone up from 150% to more than 
200%, which has exceeded 20% to 25% of the historical 
average level (Daniel, 2017). The losses of Banking in 
enterprise loans account for at least 7% of GDP (Lipton, 
2016). It implies that the bad loan of bank stemming from 
corporate debt will be increased with raising enterprise’s 
debts in the medium and long term (Daniel, 2017). The 
exorbitant debts of corporates have become a core issue 
in China (Thompson, 2007). Moreover, local government 
debts have risen to more than RMB¥1.6 trillion yuan 
for six consecutive months since January 2018 because 
of rising of the implicit debt and the debt repayment 
(Commissioner Office of Hunan, 2017). It increases the 
possibility of uncertainly triggering contingent debt risk 
of local governments (Xu, 2018). 
Facing increasing debts, the majority of the studies 
have focused on various factors of impacting debts on 
corporates and local governments as well, including 
distorted incentive mechanism based on GDP performance 
appraisal along for local officials, fiscal decentralization 
between central and local governments and mismatching 
the authorization between financial and administrative 
for both sides, and lacking standardized local financing 
platform (Zhong & Yong 2015; Han et al., 2017). Many 
researches proposed strategies to deal with debt risks of 
enterprise, bank and local government separately, such as 
convert enterprise debt and bank’s bad loan into equity 
and sell them in the financial markets, and borrow new 
debts to return the old ones for local governments (Wu, 
2018; Cao & Guo, 2017).
Meanwhile, few literature have touched upon the 
impact of local government guarantee on debt connection 
between corporates and local governments. Some studies 
describe government guarantees but concentrate on 
different dimensions. Peng (2017) illustrates the indicators 
of implicit government guarantee. Xu (2016) discusses 
the relationship between government guarantees and soft 
budget constraints for state-owned enterprises. Zhu (2016) 
concludes that different ownership industrial sectors are 
explicitly or implicitly financed by government guarantees 
but lacks empirical examination. Wang et al. (2016) 
analyze the debt default risk of local government due to 
the implicit guarantee of local governments for the urban 
infrastructure investment bonds. 
The above studies provide valuable analysis about the 
roles and types of government guarantee but there are 
insufficient on the debt accumulation between corporates 
and local government that is related to local government 
guarantee.
1.  OBJECTIVES
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate that partial 
enterprises debt has been transferred into local 
governments, particularly, to debt repayment of local 
government (DRLG) rather than completely to be sold 
in the financial markets through the strategy of debt-for-
equity swaps. The channel of debt transfer is related to 
local government guarantee that actually acts as a debt 
transferring mechanism and leads to local fiscal risks 
more hidden, complex and rapidly deformed (China 
Academy of Financial Sciences, 2017). 
To examine whether there is the debt correlation 
between enterprise and local government, we use the 
feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) model to test 
hypotheses with data of 19 provinces from 2007 to 2016 
in China. The empirical results confirm that there is a 
statistically significant and positive relationship between 
enterprises and local government debts because corporate 
debts are guaranteed or payed by local governments. 
If the issue of local government’s fiscal policy is not 
addressed, deflating the debt bubble would bring only 
temporary effect (Daniel, 2017). Thus, this study provides 
an empirical evidence for central government to take 
necessary strategy to pursuing sustainable fiscal policy 
through prohibiting local government guarantee.
2.  THE THEORETICAL REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESES
2.1  The Concept and Characteristics of Local 
Government Guarantee
local government guarantee is one of important fiscal 
policy instruments of local government which was widely 
promoted after the recent global financial crisis. Simply, 
to reduce the negative impact of global financial crisis 
on Chinese economy, central government launched the 
RMB¥4 trillion fiscal expenditure package for the purpose 
of stabilizing economic growth. However, more than half 
of the expenditure needed to rely on local government 
budgets (Chen & Zhao, 2009). Local governments have 
no authority to impose taxes without national legal 
permission, and thus local government guarantee to be 
become an essential fiscal policy instruments in order to 
keeping local economic constant.
The definition of local government guarantee, based on 
the studies of Ma & Ma (2018, p.73) and the Commissioner 
Office of Hunan (2017, p.5), means the committed 
mechanism of compensating for debt of enterprises that 
participate in government industrial investment projects 
through coordinating bank and social capital in order to 
make up for the local fiscal deficit during the process of 
promoting local economy by local governments. 
Local government guarantee is characterized by 
the secured debt that is recognized as performing joint 
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repayment for the warrantees of insolvency (enterprises 
or banks) based on the law in the name of the government 
directly or indirectly (MFC, 2014). 
The roles of government guarantees are double both at 
central and local government levels, that is, may promote 
economic growth but could cause local government 
to step into debt trap (Ma & Ma, 2018). Because once 
enterprise debts and their bad loans are paid or secured by 
the local government, those debts will be transferred from 
bank to the debt repayment of local government (DRLG) 
according to the legal agreement between banks and local 
governments. Thus, local government guarantee, in fact, 
acts as a debt transfer mechanism that shifts enterprise 
debts or their bad loan from banks to the DRLG.
2.2  The Theoretical Review and Hypotheses
The soft budget constraint theory and some studies 
describe the relationship between corporate debt and 
the DRLG. First, the Soft budget constraint theory is 
usually used to explain moral hazard and inefficiency 
due to government assistance. Basically, the soft budget 
constraint implys that government provides deficit 
enterprises and organizations with financial subsidies, 
tax cuts and loans in order to achieve economic goals or 
maintain social stability and political support (Kornai, 
1986; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Before and after the 
current global financial crisis, soft budget constraint 
have become a common phenomenon in many countries 
(Zettelmeyer et al., 2017).
Second, the phenomenon of soft budget constraint is 
reflected by the process of promoting economic growth. 
Local governments are the drive force to promote local 
economic growth through encouraging investment and 
providing financial support directly or indirectly to 
enterprises that are engaged in government industrial 
projects (Yang & Li, 2013). Lin et al. (2004) investigate 
that there are soft budget constraint both in state-owned 
and non-state-owned enterprises. For example, the deficit 
enterprises that are engaged in government investment 
projects will be given policy subsidies and preferential 
treatment by local governments.
Recently, under the circumstances of overcapacity 
and economic downturn, the solvency of enterprises has 
further declined, the debt ratio of state-owned and non-
state-owned enterprises has climbed (Lu & Han, 2015). 
To pay for the loss of the above enterprise, the burden of 
debt repayment of local government has become more 
heavy. According to the above review of literature, the 
hypothesis 1 is put forward:
(a)  H1: There is a significant positive correlation 
between the increase of enterprise debt and the 
raise of debt repayment of local government.
Third, the impact of soft budget constraint is also 
shown by the connection among enterprise debts, bad loan 
of banks and local government guarantee. With gradually 
shifting the responsibility of financial support for the state-
owned enterprises from central government to the state-
owned banks, the central government almost no longer 
provides any financial subsidies to the enterprises but 
rather delays repaying debts or adds new loans to deficit 
enterprises by commercial banks when profits of state-
owned enterprises decline for whatever reasons (Lin et al., 
2004). Meanwhile, local governments encourage banks to 
finance enterprises of undertaking government investment 
projects through policy loans. Particularly, state-owned 
enterprises are more easily to obtain the secured loans 
from banks due to the state-owned relationship with local 
governments (Wang & Yang, 2017). It leads to increasing 
bad loans of banks. The rise of bank’s bad loans is 
correspondingly with increasing debts of state-owned 
enterprise (Fan, 1999).    
However, to reduce the risk of paying for the loss of 
debtor’s default, banks require the local government to 
undertake the responsibility to pay off the debt of the 
insolvent debtors in accordance with legal contracts or 
related agreements between bank and local governments 
(Luo & Liu, 2016).
Therefore, banks would transfer the bad loans that 
stem from enterprise debts to the local government (Liao 
& Liu, 2005) based on the contract between both sides. 
In this case, local government guarantee actually works 
as a debt transferring mechanism through shifting debts 
from enterprise or banks to the DRLG because of its fiscal 
guarantee for corporate debts and relative bad loans of 
bank. Therefore, we propose hypothesis 2:
(b)  H2: Enterprise debts and their bad loans of banks 
are positively related to the DRLG.
3.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1  Data Sources and Variable Description
We collect annual and provincial panel data of debt 
repayment of local government(DRLG), total debt of non-
financial enterprises (TDE), bad loans of commercial 
bank (BLCB), average gross domestic product (i.e., GDP 
per capita) and investment effectiveness of the real estate 
enterprises (EIER) in nineteen major provinces of China 
from 2007 to 2016. 
Data on debt repayment of local government (measure 
in billion yuan of RMB) as the dependent variable 
were obtained from the published official database: the 
National Bureau of Statistics of the people’s republic of 
China (PRC) and the Ministry of Finance of the PRC. 
The DRLG refers to paying for interest of national debt, 
local government bonds, financing platform loans and 
foreign debt from local government revenue in current 
year. It reflects the substantial pressure of debt payment of 
local governments. Thus, it is a more effective measure to 
check the debt payment ability of provincial governments.
The total debt of non-financial enterprises as the 
independent variable, including enterprise debts of state-
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owned, private-owned, foreign-owned and the real estate 
(measure in billion yuan of RMB), was collected from 
the National Bureau of Statistics of the PRC and National 
Audit Office of the PRC. The total debt of enterprise 
is derived by adding up the group of enterprise debts 
together in which including enterprise debts of state-
owned (DSOE), private-owned (DPE), foreign-owned 
(DFE) and the real estate (DRE). To reduce multi-
collinearity, we categorize enterprises based on their 
ownership rather than on industrial sectors, and choice 
the service sector, the real estate enterprise, as one of 
independent variables according to its important impact 
on the DRLG.
The bad loans of commercial bank (measure in billion 
yuan of RMB) as the moderating variable were taken from 
the official database: the National Audit Office of the 
PRC, China Bank Regulatory Commission and Provincial 
Bureau of Statistics in China.
Data on average gross domestic product (measure in 
billion yuan of RMB) and the investment effectiveness of 
the real estate enterprises (measure in Percentage) as the 
control variables were gotten from Statistical Yearbook 
published by National Bureau of Statistics of the PCR. 
The GDP per capita for nineteen provinces is calculated 
by using real GDP divided by their population. The 
EIER is computed by using the value added of real estate 
divided by fixed assets investment in real estate sector (Jao, 
1997).
The banks mentioned in this study are all commercial 
banks. The non-financial enterprises and other provinces 
with insufficient data were excluded from the sample. 
All of data and variables are measured by the natural 
logarithm. We analyzed data by STATA 15.0.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics on the variables 
employed in the research. 
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics to Study Variables (2007-2016)
Variable Mean SD Minimum Median Maximum 
Ln(DRLG) (RMB billions) 4.364 0.055 0.604 4.443 6.282
Ln(TDE) (RMB billions) 9.643 0.065 6.623 9.697 11.548
Ln(DSOE) (RMB billions) 8.567 0.062 5.252 8.713 9.843
Ln(DPE) (RMB billions) 7.488 0.100 3.251 7.660 9.823
Ln(DFE) (RMB billions) 7.399 0.097 4.103 7.259 9.993 
Ln(DRE) (RMB billions) 8.569 0.084 5.694 8.625 10.972
Ln(AGDP) (%) 1.255 0.040 0.056 1.249 2.659
Ln(IERE) (RMB billions) -1.106 0.039 - 2.893 -1.100 - 0.181
According to Table 1, the average debts of state-
owned enterprise (DSOE) is higher than debts of private 
enterprise (DPE) and foreign-owned enterprise (DFE) 
in industrial sectors because the mean (8.567), median 
(8.713) and minimum (5.252) of DSOE were higher than 
those enterprises. The debt of the real estate enterprise 
is higher than the DSOE. However, the investment 
effectiveness of real estate enterprises is low according to 
the mean (-1.106).
3.2  Study Model
This research applies the feasible generalized least squares 
(FGLS) regression model to test hypotheses so that deal 
with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Model (1) is 
to examine the debt connection between enterprise debts 
and debt repayment of local government and to test H1.
Ln(DRLGit)=α0+β1Ln(TDit)+β2Ln(AGDPit)+β3Ln(EIER
it)+εit (1)
Where Ln stands for the natural logarithm, subscript 
i and t represent province and time separately, DRLGit 
represents the debt repayment of government for 
province ith at time t; TDEit symbolizes the total debt 
of non-financial enterprise in province ith at time t, in 
which includes enterprise debts of state-owned (DSOE), 
private-owned (DPE), foreign-owned (DFE) and the real 
estate (DRE), respectively, GDP per capita (AGDP) and 
investment effectiveness of the real estate enterprises ( 
EIER) are control variables, and ε is the error term.
In addition, the relationship between enterprise debts 
and the DRPG may be affected by the bad loans of bank 
that are associated with local government guarantee which 
transfers enterprise’s bad loans from banks to the DRLG 
according to the legal agreement between banks and local 
governments. To investigate the impact of bad loan of 
bank on the relationship between enterprise debts and the 
DRPG, the interaction term (TDE×BLCB ) is introduced 
in Model (2), in which includes the group of interaction 
terms (DSOE×BLCB, DPE×BLCB, DFE×BLCB and 
DRE×BLCB).
L n ( D R L G i t ) = α 0+ β 1 L n ( T D i t ) + β 2 L n ( T D i t ) 
×Ln(BDit)+β3Ln(AGDPit) +β4Ln(EIERit)+εit   (2)
Where DRLGit is the debt repayment of government 
for province ith at time t; TDEit is the total debt of 
enterprise in province ith at time t, including DSOE, DPE, 
DFE and DRE; BLCBit represents the moderating variable 
bad loan of commercial banks for province ith at time t; 
AGDP and EIER are control variables, and ε is the error 
term.
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4.  RESULTS
In this section, we present the test results based on the 
FGLS model for the correlation between enterprise debts 
and the DRLG outlined by model (1) in Table 2, and the 
joint influence of the enterprise debts and their bad loans 
of banks on DRLG outlined by model (2) in Table 3, 
respectively.
4.1  The Test Results of the FGLS Model
Table 2 provides the regression results of the correlation 
between enterprise debts and the DRLG. The significant 
correlations between the total debt of enterprise and 
DRPG is demonstrated (coefficient=0.635; p<0.001). It 
means that a 1% increasing in total debt of enterprise may 
push up 0.635% of the DRLG in general. 
Table 2 
Regression Results for the Correlation Between Enterprise Debts and the DRLG
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -1.309*** 1.890*** 2.293*** 0.481* -1.176***
(-4.15) (8.29) (17.10) (2.56) (-3.39)
InAGDP -0.102 0.740*** 0.299*** -0.907*** -0.614***
(-0.56) (11.67) (5.66) (-6.00) (-7.32)
InIERE 0.210** 0.277*** 0.165*** -0.110 0.320***
(3.06) (5.66) (5.22) (-1.36) (3.68)
InTDE 0.635***
(15.37)
InDSOE 0.246***
(7.44) 
InDPE 0.264*** 
(13.33)
InDFE 0.602*** 
(18.41)
InDRE 0.791***
(16.52)
Observations 198 197 197 198 178
Wald chi2 1803.50 1416.11 2768.17 3256.26 955.01
Prob(chi2-statistic ) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: Values in brackets express t-statistic. 
***,** and * indicate that the coefficient is significant at the levels 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
The coefficients of the enterprises within the group are 
positive and statistically significant at 0.001 level. The 
coefficient of DSOE is 0.246, and statistically significant 
at 0.001% level. It means that, with other variables 
holding constant, a 1% increasing in the debts of state-
owned enterprise will lead to a 0.246% increase in the 
DRLG. Compared to the firms of private-owned and 
foreign-owned, a 1% increasing in the DPE and DFE will 
lead to a 0.264% and a 0.602% increase in the DRPG, 
respectively. Obviously, the coefficient of the DRE is 
significant and positive to the DRLG (coefficient=0.791; 
p<0.001). Therefore, H1 is confirmed.
Table 3 shows the results of the regression analysis to 
the joint influence of the enterprise debts and their bad 
loans of banks on DRLG. 
Table 3
Regression Results for Interacting Effects
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -1.309*** 1.354*** 2.531***  0.508*** -1.079*
(-4.15) (4.69) (19.17) (6.41) (-2.39)
Control variables
InAGDP 0.261** 0.631***  0.167*** -0.280*** -0.593***
(3.06) (5.67) (5.93) (-5.28) (-4.69)
InIERE 0.029 0.030 0.129*** -0.321*** 0.303**
(0.41) (0.42) (5.43) (-17.79) (3.08)
To be continued
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Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Moderating variable
InBLCB 0.113** 0.154*** 0.151*** 0.073* 0.110** 
(2.80) (4.09) (3.59) (2.56) (2.81)
Interaction effect
InTDE×InBLCB 0.248***
(15.76)
InDSOE×InBLCB 0.214***
(6.22)
InDPE×InBLCB 0.093***
(4.79)
InDFE×InBLCB 0.086***
(4.93) 
InDRE×InBLCB 0.085*
(2.11) 
Observations 197 197 196 198 177
Wald chi2 2883.76 1520.54 699.95 2778.53 234.54
Prob(chi2-statistic ) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note. Values in brackets express t-statistic. 
***,** and * indicate that the coefficient is significant at the levels 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Continued
Based on Table 3, the joint influence of the enterprise 
debts and their bad loans of banks on DRLG indicates 
statistically significant and positive relationship. The 
coefficient estimate of TDE×BLCB is positive and 
statistically significant at 0.001 level (coefficient=0.248, 
p<0.001). It means that a RMB¥100 million yuan 
increasing in the total debt of industrial enterprises and 
their bad loans of bank will raise 25% of the DRLG. 
Within the group, the regress results are also 
significant and positive to the DRLG. The coefficient 
estimate of DSOE×BLCB (coefficient=0.214, p<0.001), 
DPE×BLCB (coeff ic ien t=0 .093 ,  p<0 .001)  and 
DFE×BLCB (coefficient=0.086, p<0.001) are positive and 
statistically significant at 0.001 level separately. Those 
results show that a RMB¥100 million yuan increasing and 
their bad loans of bank in the DSOE, DPE and DFE will 
add 21%, 0.093% and 0.086% of the DRLG, respectively. 
The coefficient of DRE×BLCB (coefficient=0.085, 
p<0.05) is positive and statistically significant at 0.05% 
level. Therefore, H2 is supported.
5.  DISCUSSION
The empirical studies in this research confirm our findings. 
For example, there is a positive relationship between 
enterprise debts and the DRLG. Moreover, enterprise’s 
bad loans of banks are transferred to the DRLG due to the 
debt transfer mechanism-local governments guarantee. It 
is demonstrated by the significant and positive interaction 
effects between enterprise debts and their bad loans of 
bank on the DRLG. In addition, the problem of local 
governments guarantee lies in pushing up accumulating 
debts of both enterprise and local governments, and 
incurs the DRLG to be more hidden and complicated 
(Commissioner Office of Hunan, 2017).
5.1  Implications
The study verifies the problem of local government 
guarantee that increases debt risk accumulation between 
enterprises and local governments, and local government 
guarantee acts as a debt risk transferring mechanism which 
transfers enterprise’s bad loans of bank to the DRLG. 
Thus, the empirical results of this paper support central 
government to prohibit local government guarantee and to 
promote hard budget constraint that are favor of curbing 
corporate debts and bad loans to be transferred from banks 
to the DRLG and reversing the expectations of enterprises 
and local governments on soft budget constraints of 
central government.
Furthermore, based on previous studies and research of 
this paper, we also find that local government guarantee 
is working together with the investment pattern and 
causes the debt symbiotic phenomenon between corporate 
and the DRLG. On the one hand, the investment pattern 
of local governments excessively incited and financed 
enterprises to invest strategical industrial sectors that were 
supported by central government’s industry policy but 
ignored encouraging firms to invest according to market 
demands. This investment pattern would inevitably lead 
to overcapacity accompanied by investment inefficiency, 
accumulating enterprise debts and increasing bad loan of 
banks. One the other hand, enterprise debts and their bad 
loans would be shifted from banks to the DRLG through 
the debt transferring mechanism. The impact of debt risk 
accumulation and repeating cycle between corporates and 
local governments on economic growth has led to Chinese 
economic going down turn.
To avoid debt repeating cycle between enterprises 
and governments, we further suggest that may combine 
forbidding local government guarantee with improving 
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investment pattern through establishing the government-
led framework of joint policy-making including the 
technical expertise of professionals of enterprises, banks 
and consumers for investing judgment (Lipton, 2016), 
setting standards and evaluation mechanism for sectors to 
enter national strategical industries and guiding the sectors 
without involving in government strategical projects 
to invest according to market demands. The purpose is 
to reduce overinvestment and subsequent overcapacity 
in target sectors. Meanwhile, it is also important to 
reform financial pattern of local governments through 
restricting inefficient enterprises to be financed from 
banks (Zhong, 2016) and promoting multi-level capital 
markets for expanding the proportion of direct financing 
of enterprises. 
In addition, the majority of previous literature focused 
on dealing with debt risks of enterprise, bank and local 
government separately rather than on the debt transferring 
chain among them. Few research explored the debt 
correlation between enterprises and government, but were 
neither providing empirical analysis nor distinguishing the 
role of local government guarantee as a debt transferring 
mechanism. This research supplements the inadequacy of 
the existing literature. Moreover, some studies of other 
countries conclude that China experience is characterized 
by government-led and investment-led growth as the 
fastest growing country in the world (Sahoo et al., 
2010; Lee & Plummer, 2004). This study proposes the 
suggestion for macroeconomic policy makers to better 
understand that keeping fiscal policy sustainability is the 
first prerequisite to maintain the sustainability of debt 
and economic growth. Otherwise, the speed of economic 
growth has to be slowed down because of reducing 
the unsustainable debts both in enterprises and local 
governments.
5.2  Limitation and Directions for Future Research
The limitations of this article include that lack analyses 
in the reasons of local government guarantee which 
is relative to the imperfect structure of government 
revenues and outlays at different government levels 
(Mendoza & Oviedo, 2006), and only test the results of 
enterprise’s bad loans of banks to be guaranteed by local 
governments without taking into account for other implicit 
government guaranteed types of enterprise debts (e.g., 
urban infrastructure investment bonds). Furthermore, we 
merely concentrate on examining the positive relationship 
between enterprise debts and the DRLG but lack empirical 
test for the impact of investment and financing patterns of 
local governments on corporate debts, and obtains relative 
conclusion according to previous literature. Further 
research may be engaged in exploring the possible ways 
to promoting sustainable fiscal policy and investment 
pattern of local governments.
In conclusion, the goal of fiscal policy should focus 
on reducing the public debt risks as a whole, instead of 
accumulating or stimulating debt risks when promotes 
local economic development (Chinese Academy of 
Financial Sciences, 2018). The phenomenon of debt 
accumulation between enterprises and local governments 
is only a superficial result. The substantive issue lies in 
mixing financing and investment together and paying for 
ineffective investment by local government guarantee 
(Commissioner Office of Hunan, 2017). The consequences 
are associated with soaring government debt trap due to 
increasing transferred debts from enterprises and banks, 
and leading to unsustainable debt of local governments. 
Ma & Ma (2018) document that the debt risk of local 
government may not be controlled if the financial support 
from central government is less than around 30%.
The policy implications based on findings of this 
article could have broader significance for improving the 
fiscal policy efficiency of local governments in China, 
and provide empirical results about the importance of 
promoting sustainable fiscal policy during the processes 
to pursue rapidly economic growth.
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NOTE
The provinces selected in the sample data include: Hebei, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, 
Sanxi, Shanxi, Shandong, Zhejiang, Sichuan, Hainan, 
Yunnan, Gansu, Anhui, Fujian, Jilin and Liaoning.
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